We focus on Timothy Williamson’s recent attack on the epistemological significance of the a priori–a posteriori distinction, and offer an explanation of why, fundamentally, it does not succeed. We begin by setting out Williamson’s core argument, and some of the background to it and move to consider two lines of conciliatory response to it—conciliatory in that neither questions the central analogy on which Williamson's argument depends. We claim, setting aside a methodological challenge to which Williamson owes an answer, that no (...) satisfactory such reconciliation is in prospect. Rather, as we then argue, —and it is on this that we base our overall negative assessment of his argument—Williamson’s core analogy is flawed by an oversight. We conclude with some brief reflections on Williamson’s ideas about the imagination as a source of knowledge. Our principal conclusion is only that Williamson’s argument fails to perform as advertised. A constructive case for confidence, to the contrary, that the intuitive contrast between a priori and a posteriori reflects something of fundamental epistemological significance is prefigured in our final section, but will not be elaborated here. (shrink)

This essay explores the collections of Observationes, whether medicae or chirurgicae, published in Amsterdam from about 1640 to about 1690, or from Nicolaas Tulp to Frederik Ruysch. Since many Observationes were illustrated, I pay special attention to the role of images, with special emphasis on those representing diseased states. The works by Gerardus Blasius appear especially informative about contemporary practices including clinical teaching, physical examinations, postmortems, collecting, and visual representation.

This research responds to urgent calls to fill knowledge gaps on COVID-19 in communicating social distancing messages to the public in the most convincing ways. The authors explore the effectiveness of framing social distancing messages around prosocial vs. self-interested appeals in driving message compliance and helping behavior. The results show that when a message emphasizes benefits for everyone in society, rather than solely for the individual, citizens find the message more persuasive to engage in social distancing, and also more motivating (...) to help others. The results further demonstrate that the proposed effects are higher for individuals who have a lower locus of control and lower fear of coronavirus as prosocial messages lead them to feel a joint responsibility in protecting from the pandemic. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed. (shrink)

Buddhism perspectives on death; criticism on the thoughts of Buil khyup On Chan, a political leader and Shyan Ukkattha, a famous Buddhist monk in Burma.

If what is morally right or wrong were ultimately a function of our opinions, then even such reprehensible actions as genocide and slavery would be morally right, had we approved of them. Many moral philosophers find this conclusion objectionably permissive, and to avoid it they posit a moral reality that exists independently of what anyone thinks. The notion of an independent moral reality has been subjected to meticulous metaphysical, epistemological and semantic criticism, but it is hardly ever examined from a (...) moral point of view. In this essay I offer such a critique. I argue that the appeal to an independent moral reality as a ground for moral obligations constitutes a substantive moral mistake. However, I do not conclude from this that we must therefore embrace the opposite view that moral truths are ultimately dependent on our attitudes. Rather, I suggest that we reject both of these views and answer the classic meta-ethical question “Is what we morally ought to do ultimately a function of our actual attitudes, or determined independently of them?” with Neither. (shrink)

Neither laziness nor its condemnation are new inventions, however, perceiving laziness as a social condition that afflicts a 'nation' is. In the early modern era, Ottoman political treatises did not regard the people as the source of the state's problems. Yet in the nineteenth century, as the imperial ideology of Ottomanism and modern discourses of citizenship spread, so did the understanding of laziness as a social disease that the 'Ottoman nation' needed to eradicate. Asking what we can learn about Ottoman (...) history over the long nineteenth-century by looking closely into the contested and shifting boundaries of the laziness - productivity binary, Melis Hafez explores how 'laziness' can be used to understand emerging civic culture and its exclusionary practices in the Ottoman Empire. A polyphonic involvement of moralists, intellectuals, polemicists, novelists, bureaucrats, and, to an extent, the public reveals the complexities and ambiguities of this multifaceted cultural transformation. Using a wide variety of sources, this book explores the sustained anxiety about productivity that generated numerous reforms as well as new understandings of morality, subjectivity, citizenship, and nationhood among the Ottomans. (shrink)

In a recent article, Hayakawa and Keysar (2018) propose that mental imagery is less vivid when evoked in a foreign than in a native language. The authors argue that reduced mental imagery could even account for moral foreign language effects, whereby moral choices become more utilitarian when made in a foreign language. Here we demonstrate that Hayakawa and Keysar's (2018) key results are better explained by reduced language comprehension in a foreign language than by less vivid imagery. We argue that (...) the paradigm used in Hayakawa and Keysar (2018) does not provide a satisfactory test of reduced imagery and we discuss an alternative paradigm based on recent experimental developments. (shrink)

If what we want from moral inquiry were the obtainment of objective moral truths, as moral realism claims it is, then there would be nothing morally unsatisfactory or lacking in a situation, in which we somehow had access to all moral truths, and were fundamentally finished with morality. In fact, that seems to be the realists’ conception of moral heaven. In this essay, however, I argue that some sort of moral wakefulness – that is, always paying attention to the subtleties (...) of life and people, and never taking for granted what their moral significance can possibly be – is an essential moral value, and, therefore, moral realism, which promotes a moral ideal that allows such moral lethargy and inattentiveness is morally objectionable. (shrink)

Leibniz's dispute with Newton over the physico-mathematical theories expounded in the Principia Mathematica have long been identified as a crucial episode in the history of science. Dr. Bertoloni Meli examines several hitherto unpublished manuscripts in Leibniz's own hand illustrating his first reading of and reaction to Newton's Principia. Six of the most important manuscripts are here edited for the first time. Contrary to Leibniz's own claims, this new evidence shows that he had studied Newton's masterpiece before publishing An Essay on (...) the Causes of Celestial Motions. This article, representing his response to Newton, is included here in English translation. Dr. Bertoloni Meli analyses the important implications of this episode on a variety of themes ranging from priority claims to the mathematization of nature in the seventeenth century. Besides providing a careful study of Leibniz's style and strategy, the author examines how our perception of Newton's achievement is affected and the reception of the rival theories by the mathematical community around 1700. "Bertoloni's book provides a very detailed and deep analysis of Leibniz's calculus and dynamics by focusing on a consistent and important set of previously unknown manuscripts..." Niccolo Guicciardini, Universita de Bologna "...Equivalence and Priority is a major contribution to our understanding of the development of mathematical physics in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century." Daniel Garber, University of Chigago. (shrink)

Eye gaze is a ubiquitous cue in child–caregiver interactions, and infants are highly attentive to eye gaze from very early on. However, the question of why infants show gaze-sensitive behavior, and what role this sensitivity to gaze plays in their language development, is not yet well-understood. To gain a better understanding of the role of eye gaze in infants' language learning, we conducted a broad systematic review of the developmental literature for all studies that investigate the role of eye gaze (...) in infants' language development. Across 77 peer-reviewed articles containing data from typically developing human infants in the domain of language development, we identified two broad themes. The first tracked the effect of eye gaze on four developmental domains: vocabulary development, word–object mapping, object processing, and speech processing. Overall, there is considerable evidence that infants learn more about objects and are more likely to form word–object mappings in the presence of eye gaze cues, both of which are necessary for learning words. In addition, there is good evidence for longitudinal relationships between infants' gaze following abilities and later receptive and expressive vocabulary. However, many domains are understudied; further work is needed to decide whether gaze effects are specific to tasks, such as word–object mapping or whether they reflect a general learning enhancement mechanism. The second theme explored the reasons why eye gaze might be facilitative for learning, addressing the question of whether eye gaze is treated by infants as a specialized socio-cognitive cue. We concluded that the balance of evidence supports the idea that eye gaze facilitates infants' learning by enhancing their arousal, memory, and attentional capacities to a greater extent than other low-level attentional cues. However, as yet, there are too few studies that directly compare the effect of eye gaze cues and non-social, attentional cues for strong conclusions to be drawn. We also suggest that there might be a developmental effect, with eye gaze, over the course of the first 2 years of life, developing into a truly ostensive cue that enhances language learning across the board. (shrink)

Syntactic templates serve as schemas, allowing speakers to describe complex events in a systematic fashion. Motion events have long served as a prime example of how different languages favor different syntactic frames, in turn biasing their speakers toward different event conceptualizations. However, there is also variability in how motion events are syntactically framed within languages. Here, we measure the consistency in event encoding in two languages, Spanish and Swedish. We test a dominant account in the literature, namely that variability within (...) a language can be explained by specific properties of the events. This event-properties account predicts that descriptions of one and the same event should be consistent within a language, even in languages where there is overall variability in the use of syntactic frames. Spanish and Swedish speakers (N= 84) described 32 caused motion events. While the most frequent syntactic framing in each language was as expected based on typology (Spanish: verb-framed, Swedish: satellite-framed, cf. Talmy,2000), Swedish descriptions were substantially more consistent than Spanish descriptions. Swedish speakers almost invariably encoded all events with a single syntactic frame and systematically conveyed manner of motion. Spanish descriptions, in contrast, varied much more regarding syntactic framing and expression of manner. Crucially, variability in Spanish descriptions was not mainly a function of differences between events, as predicted by the event-properties account. Rather, Spanish variability in syntactic framing was driven by speaker biases. A similar picture arose for whether Spanish descriptions expressed manner information or not: Even after accounting for the effect of syntactic choice, a large portion of the variance in Spanish manner encoding remained attributable to differences among speakers. The results show that consistency in motion event encoding starkly differs across languages: Some languages (like Swedish) bias their speakers toward a particular linguistic event schema much more than others (like Spanish). Implications of these findings are discussed with respect to the typology of event framing, theories on the relationship between language and thought, and speech planning. In addition, the tools employed here to quantify variability can be applied to other domains of language. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Caroline, Leibniz, and ClarkeD. Bertoloni Meli*The papers which passed between Leibniz and Clarke from 1715 to 1716 have long been considered classics in the history of science and philosophy, attracting a large number of scholarly works. Their exchanges, consisting of ten letters, five by Leibniz and five by Clarke, ended with Leibniz’s death in November 1716. 1 The letters deal with issues such as God’s role in the universe, (...) the notion of miracles, the cause of gravity, and space and time. The difficulties in interpreting the texts induced most, if not all, editors to present Leibniz’s and Clarke’s papers together with other writings to provide a context for the dispute and to elucidate the most obscure passages. This tradition was inaugurated by Samuel Clarke himself, who included in his editio princeps a number of explanatory footnotes, an appendix with passages from Leibniz’s printed works, and additional epistolary exchanges between himself and others on liberty and necessity, all with appropriate cross-references. 2 Later editors made a different selection of explanatory material, emphasizing different contexts and aspects of the dispute.The context I have selected for this essay centers on Caroline of Ansbach, Princess of Wales, her life and contacts with Leibniz prior to her departure for London, and their correspondence before and during the dispute with Clarke. [End Page 469] Portions of this correspondence can be found in the editions by H.G. Alexander and André Robinet, but the letters on which I shall spend more time are curiously excluded. They can be found among Leibniz’s political and state papers edited at the end of last century by Onno Klopp, and only in part in those edited by John M. Kemble, and in the recent German edition by Volmar Schüller. 3 The reader unaware of Caroline’s life and intellectual horizon may well wonder why Leibniz and Clarke went on relentlessly, month after month, debating in letters addressed to her whether space is the sensorium of God, dissecting the notion of miracle, and arguing about God’s role in the world. I hope to show that there are several reasons for paying attention to Caroline. The text which has become known as “Leibniz’s first paper” was in fact an extract of a letter to Caroline, not intended for Clarke, belonging to an important exchange with the Princess of Wales. Caroline engaged in a dispute with Clarke, passed the extract of Leibniz’s letter to him, and sent Clarke’s reply to Leibniz together with a request for help. Thus Leibniz’s “first paper” ought to be seen as part of his correspondence with Caroline. Later papers between Leibniz and Clarke went through Caroline.The Princess of Wales was not just a convenient address for the correspondence; nor was she a spectator uninterested in such an intellectual confrontation. She was involved in the dispute by arguing with Clarke and even with Newton, exchanging opinions with Leibniz, and functioning as an arbiter and moderator. Her presence helped shape the style and contents of the letters, and characterizes the genre to which the correspondence belongs. This is a complex issue because of the composite nature of the exchanges: on the one hand we have Leibniz’s letters to both Caroline and Clarke, on the other we have Caroline’s and Clarke’s letters to Leibniz, and Clarke’s discussions with Caroline. Clearly the standard label “Leibniz-Clarke correspondence” does not capture all levels of the exchanges. Moreover, in order to appreciate Caroline’s status in London it is worth recalling that the wife of George I, Sophie Dorothea, remained in Germany, secluded in the Castle of Ahlden. 4 Without a Queen, the Princess of Wales was the highest female royal. As an example of her influence, it was widely believed at the time that the election of William Wake as Archbishop of Canterbury in December 1715 was due to his close contacts with Caroline. At the time of the dispute Wake, who was a close friend of Clarke, neglected his pastoral duties as Bishop of Lincoln in order to be close to Caroline, with whom he held daily meetings. Thus Caroline was an... (shrink)

Der vorliegende Beitrag setzt die Überlegungen eines Forschungsentwurfs fort, dessen erster Teil im Band 63/2 dieser Zeitschrift erschien. Die historische Formel des sog. ›Disjunktionsprinzps‹ entwickelt Panofsky u.a. in dem 1944 im Kenyon Review erschienenen Artikel Renaissance and Renascences. Die grundsätzliche Mobilität antiker Kulturelemente, die er seiner Formel zuschreibt, impliziert einen bei ihm bisher unbenannten kulturtheoretischen Zugang mit deutlicher Nähe zum ethnologischen Modell der Diffusion. Ausgehend davon entwirft Panofsky mittels einer kulturmorphologischen Vorgehensweise ein transepochales Modell kultureller Tradierung. Dies ermöglicht es ihm, (...) seine Vorstellung einer hierarchischen Gliederung menschlicher (Kultur‑)Epochen am Beispiel der Antikenrezeption zu festigen. Um sich den kulturtheoretischen Implikationen in Panofskys Ausführungen zu nähern, sollen hier jene Stationen beleuchtet werden, die Panofskys intellektuellen Horizont möglicherweise mitgeformt haben – so z.B. die Prägung durch Aby Warburg, der seine Ausbildung in Bonn u.a. unter der Lehre Karl Lamprechts absolvierte. Zum anderen wird Panofskys Argumentation mit den Ideen deutscher Diffusionisten verglichen. Die vergleichende Methode offenbart nicht nur erstmalig deutliche Analogien, sondern zeigt, wie Panofsky mittels Antikenrezeption eine spezifische Vorstellung von der menschlichen Kulturgeschichte vorgibt. The article continues the considerations of a research draft, the first part of which was published in volume 63/2 of this journal. Panofsky develops the historical formula of the socalled ›principle of disjunction‹ in the article ›Renaissance and Renascences‹ published in the Kenyon Review in 1944. The fundamental mobility of ancient cultural elements, which he ascribes to his formula, implies a previously unnamed cultural-theoretical approach with a clear proximity to the ethnological model of diffusion. On this basis, Panofsky uses a cultural morphological approach to design a transepochal model of cultural transmission. This enables him to consolidate the idea of a hierarchical structure of human (cultural) epochs using the example of the reception of antiquity. In order to approach the cultural-theoretical implications in Panofsky’s remarks, those stations that may have shaped Panofsky’s intellectual horizon will be examined – e.g. the influence of Aby Warburg, who completed his education in Bonn under the teachings of Karl Lamprecht, among others. On the other hand, Panofsky’s argumentation is compared with the ideas of German diffusionists. The comparative method not only reveals clear analogies for the first time, but also shows how Panofsky uses the reception of antiquity to provide a specific idea of human cultural history. (shrink)

"Diffusion – Disjunktion – Distanz Erwin Panofskys kulturmorphologische Grundierung oder Nachdenken über Renaissanceand Renascences (1944) Der vorliegende Beitrag skizziert den ersten Teil eines Forschungsentwurfs, in dessenZentrum Erwin Panofskys Artikel Renaissance and Renascences aus dem Jahr 1944steht. Die Analyse des Textes fokussiert Panofskys historische Formel des sog. ›Disjunktionsprinzips‹zur Antikenrezeption und beleuchtet das inliegende Verständniskultureller Prozesse und Zusammenhänge. Der Blick wird auf die kulturtheoretischenImplikationen gelenkt, die in Panofskys Formel enthalten sind. Diese impliziertnämlich eine grundsätzliche Mobilität antiker Kulturelemente. Mit Nähezum ethnologischen Modell der (...) Diffusion wird ein kulturtheoretischer Zugangzu Panofskys Arbeit ermöglicht, der bisher ebenso wenig beachtet wie ideengeschichtlichkontextualisiert wurde. Dabei wird deutlich, dass kulturelle Tradierungsich anhand diffusionistischer Erklärungsmuster mit dem Ziel formiert, einehierarchische Ordnung europäischer (Kultur‑)Epochen am Beispiel der Antikenrezeptionzu postulieren. Der Ansatz zeigt das Potenzial, welches sich im Vergleichdominanter Strömungen der deutschen Ethnologie und der Kunstgeschichte imfrühen 20. Jahrhundert verbirgt. This article sketches the first part of a research project centred on Erwin Panofsky’s article»Renaissance and Renascences« from 1944. The analysis of the text focuses on Panofsky’shistorical formula of the so-called ›principle of disjunction‹ for the reception of antiquity andsheds light on the internal understanding of cultural processes and contexts. The view is directedto the cultural-theoretical implications contained in Panofsky’s formula. This implies afundamental mobility of classical cultural elements. The proximity to the ethnological modelof diffusion enables a cultural-theoretical approach to Panofsky’s work that has so far beenignored, nor has it been contextualized in terms of a history of ideas. It becomes clear thatcultural tradition is formed on the basis of diffusionist explanatory patterns with the aim ofpostulating a hierarchical order of European (cultural) epochs using the example of the receptionof antiquity. The approach shows the potential hidden in the comparison of dominantcurrents in German ethnology and art history in the early 20th century ". (shrink)

Dans cet ouvrage de 200 pages et de 7 chapitres très conséquents, Carine Guérandel analyse les effets des politiques d’insertion par le sport sur les rapports sociaux de sexe des jeunes de milieux populaires. Centré sur une monographie de quartier d’une grande métropole française, elle interroge le rôle des dispositifs sportifs dans la production/reproduction des inégalités sexuées et de classes dans le domaine sportif. Dans le premier chapitre intitulé « Les politiques d’intégration par le...

This contribution includes three selected works from an exhibition on _Cyborg Encounters_. These works deal with hybrid connections of human and non-human species that (might) emerge as a result of enhancement technologies and bio-technological developments. They offer not only an artistic exploration of contemporary but also futuristic aspects of the subject. Followed by an introduction by Melike Şahinol, _Critically Endangered Artwork_ (by Ayşe Melis Okay) highlights Turkey’s ongoing problems of food poverty and the amount of decreasing agricultural lands. It (...) displays seeds of a promising endemic plant to mitigate these problems using the seeds of the _Thermopsis Turcica_, a herbaceous perennial endemic plant. _Ecomasculinist Pregnancy_ (by Burak Taşdizen and Charles John McKinnon Bell) follows the design fiction methodology and illustrates a future scenario through a patient’s diary and the medical letters he receives during his pregnancy with an extinct sea-lion. _Polluted Homes_ (by Beyza Dilem Topdal) is a fictional art installation consisting of polychaete species evolved in time under the ecological circumstances prevalent in the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmara today. These works show, that manufacturing life has consequences, not only for the human body and its physical appearance, but also, for example, for gender orders, the social structure of society, and even the environment, and thus for (re)shaping (non)living matter and their environments. This Art-Science Collection intends to provide an impetus for debate about the extent to which cyborg encounters should be taken seriously. (shrink)

While growing empirical evidence suggests a continuity between human and non-human psychology, many philosophers still think that only humans can act and form beliefs rationally. In this paper, we challenge this claim. We first clarify the notion of rationality. We then focus on the rationality of beliefs and argue that, in the relevant sense, humans are not the only rational animals. We do so by first distinguishing between unreflective and reflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons in belief formation and revision. We (...) argue that unreflective responsiveness is clearly within the reach of many animals. We then defend that a key demonstration of reflective responsiveness would be the ability to respond to undermining defeaters. We end by presenting some empirical evidence that suggests that some animal species are capable of processing these defeaters, which would entail that even by the strictest standards, humans are not the only rational animals. (shrink)

This study relies on environmental stewardship, a stakeholder-enlarged view of stewardship theory, and institutional theory to analyze the relationship between CEO compensation and firms’ environmental commitment in a worldwide sample of 520 large listed firms. Our findings show that environment friendly firms pay their CEOs less total compensation and rely less on incentive-based compensation than environment careless firms. This negative relationship is stronger in institutional contexts where national environmental regulations are weaker. Our findings have important theoretical meaning and practical implications. (...) Results show that CEOs do not necessarily act opportunistically; rather some of them may be willing to act as stewards of the natural environment and accept a lower, less incentive-based compensation from environment friendly firms. This study also provides evidence of the important influence of the institutional context in setting-up CEO compensation as the relationship is stronger when national environmental regulations are weaker. Our findings question the universal validity of agency theory in explaining CEO compensation. Compensation based on pecuniary incentives might be less indicated to motivate CEOs who feel rewarded by playing a stewardship role for environment friendly firms. When designing compensation for CEOs, compensation committees and external compensation advisors should consider psychological and institutional factors that might affect CEO motivation. (shrink)

One important distinction in the debate over the nature of epistemic justification is the one between propositional and doxastic justification. Roughly, while doxastic justification is a property of beliefs, propositional justification is a property of propositions. On a rather common view, which accounts for doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification plus the so-called ‘basing relation’, propositional justification is seen as the prior notion, and doxastic justification is explained in terms of it. According to the opposing view, the direction of (...) explanation needs to be reversed, and doxastic justification should be seen as primary. I distinguish between two notions of priority, and I argue that they give different verdicts with respect to the issue of which notion of justification comes first. The lesson may be taken to be that propositional and doxastic justification are in a relation of intertwinement. (shrink)

Taking the inspiration from some points made by Scott Sturgeon and Albert Casullo, I articulate a view according to which an important difference between undermining and overriding defeaters is that the former require the subject to engage in some higher-order epistemic thinking, while the latter don’t. With the help of some examples, I argue that underminers push the cognizer to reflect on the way she formed a belief by challenging the epistemic worthiness of either the source of justification or the (...) specific justificatory process. By contrast, overriders needn’t pose any such challenge. I also consider some problems for the proposed view, and I put forward some possible solutions. Finally, I provide some details on how undermining defeat works in different cases. (shrink)

I extend the Higher-Order View of Undermining Defeat (HOVUD) defended in Melis (2014) to account for the defeat of propositional justification. In doing so, I clarify the important notion of higher-order commitment, and I make some considerations concerning the defeat of externalist epistemic warrants.